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The Stamp Act: Revolutionary Resistance in New York
Ryan L. Wagner, B.A.
ABSTRACT
Prior to the first battles of the American Revolution, the British Parliament
imposed several duties on the American colonies to fund the expenses of the French and
Indian War, continued attacks on the American frontier, taxed American colonists to
assist with British finances, and garrisoned troops throughout America. One of these
duties, the American Stamp Act, was passed and enacted in early 1765 throughout the
North American British colonies. The correlation between battles, campaigns, and acts
such as imposed duties, are all interrelated. Many historians traditionally view the
colonial reaction to the Stamp Act as one singular political event or overshadowed by the
battles fought in the war for American independence.1
This thesis has been written to examine the social and economic impact of the
American Stamp Act of 1765, and to investigate the enforcement practices and reactions
of those affected by the act, specifically in the colony of New York, and its impact on the
subsequent war for American independence. The materials utilized in this study include
both primary and secondary sources. The secondary sources aim to ensure a rounded
understanding of the Stamp Act and pre-Revolutionary thought, while primary sources
have been examined to understand specific localities as issues surrounding the Stamp Act
unraveled.
In this study, a more in-depth examination into the authority that enforced the
Act, the relationship, and interactions between those affected and those who collected the
levy, the various motives of opposition, and the eventual formation of organized
resistance and action within New York in the broader context of colonial America are
explored.
1

Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: The Kelnap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1967), 22-23.
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INTRODUCTION
“It cannot be good to tax the Americans… You will lose more than you gain.”
-Thomas Hutchinson, 1765
The British Parliament passed the American Stamp Act on March 22nd, 1765 and
decreed its implementation would take effect on November 1st of the same year in British
North America.1 From passage to repeal, it was law for just short of one calendar year,
being repealed March 18, 1766. The British government, however, could not have
foreseen the impact it would have on its relationship with the American colonies. This
act would be the charge that would call individuals not typically associated with
revolution into various forms of resistance. In response, American colonists began to use
violence as a legitimate political tool and forced British Parliament into a radical
restructuring of the methods used in levied taxation and organized civil authority.
Following its victory over France in the Seven Years War, Great Britain
encountered massive debts and deficiencies in its ground and naval forces. However, it
no longer concerned itself with the French threat in North America. The Treaty of Paris
of 1763 afforded the British with the opportunity to examine its assets abroad to better
raise revenue and expand its global presence and military might. Additionally,
Parliament passed the first measure to ensure the continued enforcement of the
Navigation Acts the same year. This Act placed stricter guidelines on those officials
enforcing the act and threatened the dismissal of customs officials who did not follow
protocol.2

1

Edmund Morgan and Helen Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1962), 54.
2
Ibid., 23.
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North America also witnessed other changes during this period. Following the
stricter enforcement of the Navigation Acts, European goods sent to British ports
encountered significant tax increases with the Revenue Act.3 This affected not only
luxury items like wine, but textiles and coffee as well.4 Further straining the British
Empire's citizens, French wine was restricted due to the post-war relationship between
the two nations.5 Rum imported from French colonies was not exempt from the Revenue
Act either.6 The act of removing colonists’ abilities to obtain and enjoy luxuries such as
wine and rum, while simultaneously imposing and increasing taxes, was not well
received in the colonies and the relationships between Britain and North Americans
suffered.7 Finally, with the passage of such an act, an expansion of the British customs
service garrisoned in North America was necessary for the collection of duties owed.8
To protect interests in North America, Great Britain implemented an updated
policy of maintaining a sizable military presence following the Seven Years’ War. In
1764, George Grenville, Chancellor of the Exchequer, began pursuing a stamp tax to
cover this expense. The influx of British soldiers brought mixed emotions from
Americans, but little colonial input was sought. Grenville commissioned a stamp bill to
be drafted, and those duties collected through the enforcement of said bill would be
utilized to offset those garrisons.9
Duties on stamps, legal documents, shipping papers, printed newspapers, and

3

Oliver Dickerson, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution (New York: Octagon Books, 1978),
190.
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Edward Countryman, The American Revolution (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 40.
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Dickerson, The Navigation Acts, 192.
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Ibid.
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Countryman, The American Revolution, 51.
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Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, 23.
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Ibid., 24.
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pamphlets were not a new concept in British America.10 In the 1750’s, many colonies
imposed internal duties to provide financial assistance to government functions.11
Newspaper editors in New York City were outspoken opponents of early stamp taxes but
not to the point of being moved to rebellion. Some may have viewed a tax imposed by
colonial governments acceptable. Often, these duties were short-lived and sometimes
localized. Because of the large audience found in New York City, staff members and
writers could reach a sizeable number of readers, and some authors and editors would
later take prominent roles in the movement against the Act.12
The American Stamp Act was different from previous legislation.13 Unlike those
in the past, the Stamp Act affected the collective colonies in British America.14 Local
British agents were to enforce collection policies, and for the remainder of 1765 and into
1766, Americans witnessed a wide array of collection practices.15 During Grenville’s
propositions to the House of Commons, his intentions were clear: to burden the American
colonies by taxing them into submission through required English overhead of their
commerce and consumption.16
At the direction of British Parliament, the duties were to be delivered directly to
England, collected in sterling money, and levied against most printed documents to
include maritime and customs related documents, newspapers, pamphlets, and an array of
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Countryman, The American Revolution, 41.
New York, Journal of the Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Colony of New York,
From 1766 to 1776, Inclusive (Albany: J. Buel, 1820), 521.
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legal papers.17 Early opponents contended that if the money collected was to fund
garrisons within the colonies, monies should remain in America.18 British Parliament
resolved this argument by changing details of the tax to include the stipulation the
collected duties would remain within the colonies to pay for supplies and salaries of
British troops.19
Many colonies, including New York, had begun producing paper currency but the
British government would not accept it as payment due to the sterling requirement.20 In
port cities such as New York, Americans used sterling as it carried its value across other
colonies and the Atlantic. However, utilizing colonial paper notes was growing in
popularity and had begun circulating throughout the colonies but lacked continuity. By
removing the sterling from the colonies through taxation, it severally hampered trade and
currency negotiations beyond colonial borders and many feared its long-term impact.21
While the British government enforced these policies, various American industries had
two choices: pay the duties or become creative in their business models by participating
in the economy illicitly. It is no surprise riots took place, customs officers were burned
out of their homes, newspapers closed their doors, mariners took up arms, and the stage
set for the eventual American Revolution took place due to the American Stamp Act.22
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Countryman, The American Revolution, 41.
Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, 34.
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CHAPTER ONE: ENACTMENT
“The Stamp Act imposed on the colonies by the Parliament of Great Britain is an illjudged measure. Parliament has no right to put its hands into our pockets without our
consent.”
-George Washington, 1765
Post-War Problems
The victory over the French in the Seven Years’ War virtually set in place the
events that would lead to the passage of the American Stamp Act.1 However, this
military campaign was not exclusively the rationale in the British pursued tax on the
American colonies.2 British Parliament had attempted several other duties in the past;
some short-lived while others, to some degree, proved successful. The American
response was dependent on the implementation process, collection practices, types of
goods and services taxed, and amounts levied.3
One of the first examples of colonial cooperation in an attempt to both raise
internal taxes and train a colonial militia occurred in Albany, NY in June of 1754.4 Seven
colonies sent representatives to meet with Iroquois Chiefs to secure an ally against the
French, particularly on the colonial frontier.5 Additionally, these colonies had hoped to
form a more secure alliance between colonial governments. The delegates departed with
plans of cooperation between other colonies but faced difficulty maneuvering the

1

The North American campaign of the Seven Years War is often referred to as The French and Indian War,
1754- 1763, fought between Great Britain and France.
2
Gary Nash, Unknown American Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 44-45.
3
Ibid., 46-47.
4
Mack Thompson, “Massachusetts and New York Stamp Acts,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third
Series, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Apr., 1969), 253-254.
5
Beverly McAnear, “Personal Accounts of the Albany Congress of 1754,” The William and Mary
Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Oct., 1947), 727.
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bureaucracies forming throughout the different regions of each colony.6 These obstacles
proved problematic in ratifying even an unofficial alliance. Although well before the
American Revolution, halting moves toward self-governance, internal taxation, and even
foreign policy was set into motion.7
The American campaign of the Seven Years’ War ended in 1760, and most
American colonists were pleased with their relationship with Britain. The Royal Navy
had a firm grip on the high seas, and the British Parliamentary system ensured English
manufacturing utilized goods and resources from the colonies, adding to colonial
prosperity. American industry continued to grow under the English flag. British banks
offered funds and guidance to the growing American economy. Virtually no separatist
movement existed. 8
It was a glorious time in the American colonies. They were separated from
England by several thousand miles with room to grow out of their infancy to nearly
sufficient entities, loosely separated by colonial borders and the Atlantic. Their
economies grew, at times seeming to pass those in Great Britain. By the end of the Seven
Years’ War, the British Empire was the most powerful and prosperous and its subjects
the freest in the western world.9 Because of this level of prosperity, the American-British
relationship was unclear; what now were the colonists to Great Britain and how did they
fit into the Empire?
Britons did not share the same feelings as those in the colonies and felt the

6
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American colonies had not contributed to the war and their security.10 The colonists
strongly disagreed, felt they had in fact contributed, and the entirety of the British Empire
should share the benefits of successful past conflict. The American colonies were only a
small fragment of the British Empire but had begun to demonstrate self-governance
ability. By garrisoning troops in North America, British troops offered security to
colonial America not only from the Native American threat to European interests but also
to contain any ideas of independence from European rule.11
The Spanish and Portuguese entered the war in 1762, further complicating
European relations. The conflict forced Great Britain to concentrate even further on the
European campaigns and less on the American Colonies. The cost of supplies, troops,
and security of Britain's interests had become a reality and Parliament struggled to find
ways to finance it. The Empire now had colonies in every corner of the world, and
although many of these colonies were self-sufficient, an Empire at war required an
immense amount of money for sustainability.12 Campaigns existed in not only North
America and Europe, but also the Caribbean, India, Philippians, and parts of the African
coast. The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, and Britain desired
to recover what had been lost or spent during the war.13
Following the war, the American colonies did encounter some geographic
changes. 14 To the south, East and West Florida were added to the British Empire, as was

10

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Dickerson, The Navigation Acts, 10-16.
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colonies.
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Quebec to the north. The French also conceded their claims east of the Mississippi,
including the Ohio Valley.15 Colonists were anxious to begin to settle Indian lands west
of the Appalachian Mountains. King George III intended to preserve peace in North
America, and established the Proclamation of 1763, prohibiting the settling of these
lands.16 The British government was nearly bankrupt, could not afford another war, and
hoped to appease not only the Native population but also its new French-Canadian
subjects and French and Spanish sympathizers.17
The British government began laying out ideas to generate revenue to rebuild its
Army, Navy, and replenish the treasury. With the addition of new land in North
America, Great Britain was confronted with an additional liability. Great Britain had
spent a large sum of money fighting a war and acquiring new lands but now had to ensure
it proved profitable enough to justify British protection and continued contributions to the
success of the Empire. With the additional claims in Canada, Florida, and the Mississippi
Valley, the Empire acquired new costs. These lands proved to be a great addition to the
Empire but a long-term investment, part of which, the British felt lay upon the shoulders
of those living in the American Colonies.18
In the Americas, there were dated laws in place that were intended to collect
taxes, but most were not enforced. Some were outdated while others were littered with
loopholes. Prior to the American Stamp Act, collecting duties in America had proved
less than fruitful, and the colonies continued to operate without British trade regulation

15

Taylor, American Colonies, 432.
Extract of King George III’s Proclamation of 1763.
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Taylor, American Colonies, 433.
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Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 55.
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oversight.19 Earlier in the eighteenth century, the British had enacted some regulations,
such as the Molasses Act of 1733, to protect interests and not necessarily to raise
revenue.20 By taxing molasses imported into the Americas from non-British colonies, it
effectively made British goods cheaper, which in turn encouraged their sale over nonBritish molasses. Americans primarily ignored or avoided the act through bribes or
intimidation to customs officials.21
There is a definite correlation between taxation and regulation which the British
government failed to capitalize on due to their inability to manage trade in North America
for the thirty years following the Molasses Act. Due to British regulations, American
smugglers went out of their way to transport molasses from the French and Dutch West
Indies to avoid empirical overhead. American justification for smuggling was due to the
growing industries found in North America.22 Distilleries in New York and New England
required molasses in the production of rum and avoiding regulation proved more
lucrative. New York farming demanded constant deliveries of grain to feed cattle, while
lumber, barrel staves, horses, and other American produced products could not rely solely
on the British West Indies markets. Simply, regulation was not realistic with what the
British Empire was producing, and for American industry growth to continue, colonists
pursued trade with non-British ports in the Caribbean, primarily in exchange for
molasses. As Robert Middlekauff ties it to conflict, “War usually warps normal

19

Ibid., 59.
Albert Southwick, “The Molasses Act,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Jul., 1951), 389391.
21
Ibid., 394.
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Ibid.
20

9

standards and practices, and so far as trade was concerned, normality entailed breaking
the law.”23
British officials knew the Molasses Act was mostly ineffective but were willing to
revisit it once again. Parliament wrote and passed the Sugar Act of 1764 borrowing upon
the previously failed Molasses Act. Initially, six pence per gallon duty was required, but
in an apparent move to avoid highlighting the Act, the British levied only half the
previous amount. However, duties were to be charged on all molasses and sugar,
regardless of origin, and strictly enforced. The Sugar Act also included a tax on coffee,
cloth, and silk.24 British officials took the collection of this tax much more seriously, and
with it, significant expansions of the customs service were required. At last, a tax in
place to raise revenue was levied on America.25 It was with this Act that provoked the
real question of taxation without representation.
In addition, Parliament passed the Currency Act of 1764 prohibiting the colonies
from printing and utilizing paper money. Americans were to pay British taxes and intercolonial commerce by approved means and not colonial issued paper notes.26 Because
much of what the American colonies produced was exported from the continent, there
was a constant fluctuation of legitimate British coinage and credit, further challenging
transactions with British currency. Inflation was a legitimate concern as the colonial
money lacked backing from a government body or precious metals such as gold or
silver.27
23

Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause, 59.
Spencer Tucker, James Arnold, and Roberta Wiener, The Encyclopedia of North American Colonial
Conflicts to 1775, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2008), 691-692.
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27
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Not only was there a tax on luxuries such as sugar and molasses, coffee, cloth,
and silk, but colonial printed currency was no longer viewed as a legitimate form of
payment. Fears of returning to a barter system within the colonies frightened many
merchants. According to revolutionary historian Gordon Wood, “No American
attempted to argue that the demands of the internal market alone were capable of
upholding the value of paper money.” Wood continues, “It would take the Revolutionary
War and further experience with the issue of paper money before Americans would begin
to see the significance of their domestic market and its dependence on paper currency."28
America possessed a strong argument for repeal of the Currency Act. The
colonies’ most important criticisms were rooted in the fact that the American market
supported a large part of English industry, while trade conducted inside the colonies
made the utilization of British currency very difficult. If the American system were to
fail, the British economy would suffer a significant blow. The Sugar and Currency Acts
were officially to be regulations of trade, not revenue measures. However, the American
colonies viewed them as both.29 They restricted the types of commodities that Americans
could purchase, levied a tax on those items, and forced them to be paid with a currency
that was often not available. Why they did not have the impact the American Stamp Act
did is unknown, but the unrest these two Acts provoked is apparent.
Taxation with virtual representation and colonial rights were, at this point, on the
minds of many of those living in North America and the political effects of these acts are

28

Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 141142.
29
Ibid., 32.
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important, leading up to the Stamp Act crisis.30 Imperial revenue was gradually
transformed into a constitutional issue, and during the 1760's, Americans could not raise
money without elevating a host of issues, namely economic, legal, and political.31
Colonial legislatures had begun to voice their concerns to British Parliament while
demanding a voice for their economic well-being. As the lines between politics, taxation,
and constitutional rights blurred, the probability a peaceful resolution became less
likely.32 These acts further illustrate failed British attempts to understand and act with
colonial interests in mind.33

The American Stamp Act
In the spring of 1763, George Grenville assumed the post of British Prime
Minister. The British government had incurred a significant amount of debt during the
Seven Years War, and upon acceptance of his post, Grenville's most pressing charge was
to analyze and repair British finances.34 Grenville appeared willing to entertain
objections or alternatives to the American Stamp Act for the colonies. However, he
refused outright colonial grievances against Britain’s right to levy taxes. 35 The act was
written and ready for British implementation, but after the rise in tension the Sugar Act
placed on the relationship between the colonies and Great Britain, its execution was slow.
Massachusetts and Virginia even wrote to their agents across the Atlantic that it appeared

30

Greene, The Currency Act, 463.
William Willcox and Walter Arnstein, The Age of Aristocracy: 1688 to 1830 (Lexington, MA: Heath and
Company, 1992), 162.
32
Ibid.
33
Greene, The Currency Act, 463.
34
Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, 23.
35
Ibid.
31
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the colonies might have the opportunity to levy their version of taxes, so long as Britain
received proper compensation for their North American garrisons and post-war
contributions.36 The colonies offered no alternatives to Grenville’s proposal.
From 1680 through the later part of the 18th century, most of the King's ministers
cared little about America and relied upon the expertise of others. In fact, until 1768, no
single member of the Colonial Office was charged with American affairs.37 Thomas
Whately, a subordinate of Grenville and loyal to his office, drafted the stamp bill.38
Viewed as a close aide to Grenville, Whatley was marginally qualified to draft such
legislation and called upon the assistance of other offices within British parliamentary
system. In an attempt to keep tensions low, he was proactive about notifying colonists
about the intention to pass a stamp bill and wrote many within the colonies.39 One of
these individuals was Jared Ingersoll, a loyalist to the crown living in Connecticut.40
Ingersoll’s response was not what Grenville and Whately expected. Ingersoll wrote in
July 1764, the minds of the Americans “are filled with the most dreadful apprehensions
from such steps taking place, from whence I leave you to guess how easily a tax of that
kind would be Collected; tis difficult to say how many ways could be invented to avoid
the payment of a tax laid upon a County without the Consent of the Legislature of that
Country and in opinion of most of the people Contrary to the foundation principles of
their natural and Constitutional rights and Liberties.”41

36

Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause, 71.
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Whatley was a firm proponent of virtual representation. He believed although the
colonist had no voting representatives in parliament present, Americans were afforded
representation due to their affiliation with the British Empire.42 To further his argument,
most British males were not technically represented due to the requirement to own
property made even them represented by proxy to the Empire.43 Virtual representation
expanded to every place the British flag was flown, and many Englishmen shared
Whately’s opinion. Whatley wrote to Ingersoll in Connecticut with concerns on the
consequences of such an enforced bill. “If the King should fix the proportion of our
Duty, we all say we will do our parts in the Common Cause, but if the Parliament once
interpose and Lay a tax, tho; it may be a very moderate one… what Consequences may,
or rather may not, follow?”44
Regardless of affiliation or motivation, Americans continually warned British
drafting agents that they would likely reject such legislation and a stamp tax would not be
well received.45 Most eighteenth-century Americans did not have an issue with
supporting the growing British Empire. After all, they were British. They were willing
to pay taxes, but the sampling of corresponding agents repeated a simple fact: Americans
preferred to levy and collect taxes with methods they had established without
Parliamentary intervention.46
By examining the number of continental stamps assigned to different American
colonies, the New York trade and shipping industry was a significant focus of the Stamp

42

Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, 81.
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Act.47 In a sworn statement published in 1772, the names of all distributors, the value of
the stamped paper consigned to each, and the returns received are available.48 The most
significant consignments of stamped paper went to the colonies with the most active
shipping ports with the expectations they yield the highest returns. The continent stamps
were consigned as follows: New York, £12,934; Massachusetts, £12,413; Pennsylvania,
£11,852; South Carolina, £10,818; and Virginia, £9,684, a total of £57,701, or 47.5
percent of the value of all stamped paper consigned to the continental colonies.49 The
shipping industry was directly targeted and the colony of New York the most
encumbered.
Once approved by the King, the American Stamp Act was to be enacted. During
the beginning of April, news of the Stamp Act had arrived on the shores of the Americas,
through boroughs of New York, and trickled upstate and into the Niagara Frontier, but
ignored for some time. Its implementation and American response were slow, in part due
to the lack of press it received, but its process and tactics were something unseen in the
Americas before.50

Implementation and Collection
The implementation of the Stamp Act was not an overnight process. In fact, how
the tax would be instituted and collected were questions even Grenville could not answer
in Parliament.51 As King George III’s first minister and head of the treasury, George

47

Dickerson, The Navigation Acts, 192.
Ibid.
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50
Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, 37-40.
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Grenville was responsible for assisting the crown in establishing a post Seven Years War
financial plan while maintaining its empirical status as the most powerful nation in the
world.52
The year before its passage, Grenville began to consider such an Act and assigned
two aids to begin writing such legislation. Several proposals were drafted and presented
to him in September and October of 1763 but were found to be unsatisfactory.53
Grenville sought to ensure whatever proposal he presented to Parliament would be
accepted. No doubt, this would not be a popular enactment in the Americas. Members of
Parliament were anxious to author such legislation due to the possible backlash in
America and feared it likely very unpopular with their colonial subordinates.54
There was a certain way around this, however. If Parliament were to assert its
authority to collect a stamp duty through a resolution, its expansion of the right to levy
would not be limited to parcels of paper and legal documents. Grenville put forth this
resolution for Parliamentary consideration and asked for blanket approval to tax the
colonies anyway they saw fit. With this blanket approval, Grenville would see little
opposition, as it was virtually what set into the place the authority for Parliament to tax
the colonies through multiple different means, even after the Stamp Act’s repeal.55
Americans did have some support in Parliament due primarily to their heavy
dealings with the British economy. English merchants trading to America voiced their
uneasiness regarding the conflict and shared these concerns with their agents both in

52

Ibid., 53, 70-72.
Morgan, 54.
54
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America and the British government.56 However, Grenville thought if he could place
blame on the colonies and convince the voting members of Congress America had failed
to come to the assistance of the British Empire during a time of financial need and fund
their defense. Once he received an approved resolution, Grenville was able to author the
Stamp Act while receiving little British opposition from those concerned with the
Parliamentary-colonial relationship due to the unpopular colonial opposition over
taxation. 57
As mentioned previously, the American Colonies had the prerogative to levy
taxes, as they needed in the past. Some colonies had collected their own taxes to be
utilized internally, within the colonies, while others had not. Grenville sought to protect
collection practices and implementation by placing these tasks into British hands while
avoiding reliance on its American agents. This added an additional layer of his Stamp
Act worthy of analysis. Had members of Parliament understood the full extent of just
how Britain would levy this tax, it may have concerned even more of them.
There are no official accounts from Grenville on his intentions or reasoning
behind the Stamp Act’s postponement.58 There are, however, accounts written just after
Grenville’s Parliamentary proposals and some years later. According to historian
Edmund S. Morgan, some of the later accounts were written to mislead anyone who
wished to understand Grenville's motives purposely.59 Those later accounts were in some
cases from America’s agents who reportedly supported such an act but felt they might be
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viewed negatively by their constituents in America.60
Other accounts called for the delay of the Stamp Act as Grenville had previously
offered. The unknown factor is Grenville’s intentions. Was it to afford the American
colonies the opportunity to offer their own resolutions on the best means of collecting a
tax to support its military protection and the post-war British Empire? The other opinion
that historians often claim is that Grenville did not have enough information to draft and
commission the tax Parliament had employed his office to write.61
New York and Massachusetts had attempted to collect taxes through similar
means in the past, and the American agents in Britain felt even the talk of a Stamp Act
would be met with opposition. In 1755, six months after Massachusetts had passed its
stamp duty, New York followed its lead. In an effort to raise money to fund defense,
New York introduced various proposals, including a poll tax on each slave, an excise tax
on tea, and a stamp duty. Lieutenant Governor of New York, James De Lancey, sensed
British Parliament would later impose a stamp duty that would not impact one social
group primarily, but all of New York.62 In a preemptive attempt to beat the British to
such a duty, New York placed the levy into law in 1756.63 Those associated with the
newspaper industry viewed the tax negatively and a burden on business as it was much
more difficult to compete with those in neighboring colonies.64 The colonial tax was law
just four years in New York and not renewed.
Before this time, the colonies collected taxes, except those used to regulate trade,
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and then paid to the British treasury.65 With this new proposal, the colonists would now
pay duties directly to the treasury. It should be clear; Grenville was not explicitly
committed to a Stamp Act, but more concerned with effective means to raising revenue.66
The Revenue Act of 1764, commonly termed the Sugar Act, did not have the
response the British treasury had intended. It did lower the amount it collected in
comparison to its earlier version but still failed to reimburse the British Army for the
10,000 troops garrisoned within the colonies. After consideration from Grenville, his
agents, and even representatives of the colonies in England, he felt a stamp duty offered
several advantages over other duties that had been attempted or considered.67
According to an account by an individual present during Grenville’s offering of
the Stamp Act legislation to British Parliament, it “required the fewest [customs] officers,
and was attended with the least Expense in the Collecting of it.” The unnamed individual
continues in writing to his brother in Massachusetts saying, "That therefore, tho he
doubted not but that the Colonies would wish rather have no tax at all; yet as the
necessities of Government rendered it an indispensable duty, he should certainly bring
such a Bill. In the meantime, he should leave it to each province to signify their Assent
to such a Bill in General; or their requests about any particular modification of it as they
should think fit.”68
Another account from William Knox, agent for Georgia, also echoed what other
agents had written. Knox wrote that Grenville had appeared to be in no rush to hurry
legislation without offering the colonies the opportunity to counter proposals. Knox
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stated in his 1765 pamphlet, The Claim to the Colonies to an Exemption from Internal
Taxes by Act of Parliament Considered, “He [Grenville] told them further, that if the
colonies thought any other mode of taxation more convenient to them, and made any
proposition which should carry the appearance of equal efficacy with a stamp duty, he
[Grenville] would give it all due consideration.”69
These accounts were taken in May of 1764, nearly a year before a stamp duty was
to be implemented. They appeared to show Grenville's willingness to work with colonial
representatives, but as they drew closer to implementation, productive correspondence
began to disintegrate.70 For colonial legislatures, the option to implement duties in place
of an established levy from the British government was nearly impossible. To compound
the problem, after the Seven Years War, British North America had changed
dramatically, and there were few official channels for Grenville or even the British
government to work through to communicate with all colonial assemblies on a large
scale. Colonial governments were set up, and beyond trade, many worked autonomously
from one another. Managing the segmented parts of the continent proved difficult for
official correspondence by the British government difficult to both communicate and
implement official matters. In all likelihood, the British government felt it much easier to
offer the Americas a role in participating in legislation that directly affected them, but
only to save face, and gave their considerations little thought.71
Several more times in 1764, Grenville presented a Stamp Act to British
Parliament for future consideration while various drafts were being written and details
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worked out in regards to execution, collection, and allocation. New York and six other
colonies sent messages to their agents in England, and later four of those seven (including
New York) petitioned the King and Parliament in regards to the impending stamp duty.72
However, no inter-colonial messages or petitions were dispatched. For such a message to
be drafted and delivered, a colonial body would have to have been formed. Had this
occurred, such a body would need to be sanctioned by the British government.73 Would
the British government even approve such a body, knowing the possible consequences it
may have on its control over its American subordinates? New York and Massachusetts,
amongst others, formed regional relationships over their mutual concerns and
intercolonial interests. By the end of 1764, the lower houses of eight other colonies had
approved resolutions denouncing the Stamp Act and rejecting Parliament's right to tax the
Americans for revenue. Not until the Stamp Act Congress, composed of nine colonies,
had convened had there been an official colonial body formed in response to the
controversy surrounding the Stamp Act to discuss its repercussions.74
Morgan assessed the overall mood shared throughout the colonies by analyzing
correspondence between Grenville, his office, British Parliament, and the King. “These
messages and petitions varied considerably in tone: some emphasized the economic
distress of the colonies, some the willingness of the colonies to contribute to the British
Treasury if requested to do so in a regular constitutional manner, but none admitted that
Parliament had a right to levy the proposed tax and most of them vigorously asserted that
Parliament had no such right."75
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As 1764 passed, relations between the colonies and Parliament worsened under
the threat of impending legislation. With petitions and apparent disagreement over the
right to tax the colonies, talk within Parliament of passing the Stamp Act existed merely
to demonstrate its power and ability. Even in his offerings for the colonies to collect their
own taxes to support the British Armed Forces in America, Grenville never indicated the
amount each colony would be responsible for raising.76
In the early days of February 1765, the passage of the Stamp Act began to move
very quickly while Parliament had begun to refuse American petitions due to the contrary
and anti-British undertones. By mid-month after two presentations to Parliament, Great
Britain passed the American Stamp Act, which was later confirmed by the King on
March 22nd, 1765.77 Its implementation and impact would have an unforeseeable impact
on relations between the American colonies and the Imperial government in the coming
years.78
Several things should be asserted about Grenville's apparent intentions in his
offerings to the colonies. Grenville appeared to have concerns regarding the colonial
input and gave them first the option to propose their own legislation in a Parliamentary
address in 1764.79 Additionally, he alluded to offering colonial empowerment to collect
the proposed levy through their assemblies. After this offering, he began to prepare his
Stamp Act with no colonial input. Grenville’s agent, Thomas Whately, was entrusted
with preparing his Stamp Act and contacting colonial representatives, knowing
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Americans would likely not propose a tax themselves.80
Of course, different colonial assemblies confronted Grenville and Whately with
opposition. However, petitions affording colonial representatives the opportunity to
present the American argument when conferring the Stamp Act from a resolution to law
was not offered.81 This action further showed Grenville’s lack of interest in genuinely
considering the colonial positions and their lack of participation in raising revenue for the
British treasury and support for the troops garrisoned in North America.82
At a time when Great Britain stood victorious after years of war but encumbered
with a striking amount of debt, how would it ensure the colonies shouldered the burden of
their defense?83 Was the Crown justified forcing the American participation into a shared
financial burden over its protection and the further expansion of the British Empire?
With the Stamp Act, colonists found themselves facing legislation that would tax them
without consent for revenue to fund their defense.84
Grenville and his administration were unsure the best practice to implement the
Currency Act in North America and the distribution of the tax. In addition, because of its
negative press in the Americas, the treasury and excise divisions would not receive
positive input or suggestion on the most advantageous methods of collection.85 “The
Stamp Act crisis represent[ed] an important episode in tax history. It highlights the
difficulties in imposing an imperial tax across the globe at a time when communication
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mechanisms meant significant delays in relaying information between the center in
Britain and the periphery in the colonies.”86 Stamp duties were something the citizens of
Great Britain had seen since the late 17th century, and it was not unrealistic to consider it
might be successful abroad to support the Empire. However, to implement the Stamp Act
in the colonies, a reorganization of how Great Britain viewed and collected duties in the
colonies required examination.87
Previously, laws concerning trade were relatively lax. American colonists had
taken advantage of their proximity to the Caribbean and traded with Britain’s enemies for
many years without censure. Merchants forged maritime documents and avoided the
British Navy virtually unencumbered to conduct business while avoiding taxes
altogether.88 The colonial shipping industries conducted business primarily on credit
requiring paper documentation to protect both the merchants and creditors.89 Every such
paper would require a stamp. The British felt stricter trade enforcement would secure its
holdings in the Americas while also providing revenue simultaneously.90 The proposed
Stamp Act would not only do these things but also streamline the process of
documentation throughout the inter-colonial network and international trade.91
To maximize revenue through the internal tax, requirements for enhanced record
keeping would necessitate implementation.92 In doing this, the Empire ensured a much
closer eye on its North American subordinates. In addition, the Act funded British troops
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that would enforce parliamentary policies under the assumption they were garrisoned for
colonial protection.93 If implemented and enforced correctly, the Currency Act was a
brilliant idea, but the logistics of such an Act proved difficult.
A Stamp Duty is significant in that its effect would not be limited to one group
but spread through all castes of society. Passports, liquor licenses, playing cards, ships'
papers, insurance policies, almanacs, newspapers, and pamphlets were all required to
bear a stamp.94 It required cooperation not only from mariners, merchants, and lawyers,
but any individual who did work with these individuals. Additionally, this made
implementation and collection practices difficult. To some, it appeared more attractive as
“the individual burden was… lower than the more targeted forms of tax aimed at the
wealthy alone, such as land tax[es] in Britain and slave taxes in the colonies.”95 To avoid
the Stamp Act was nearly impossible unless an individual was utterly self-sufficient.
During a time when self-governance was at the forefront of the colonial mindset,
imperial involvement perplexed many English lawmakers. 96 The practices the British
crown used in the implementation of the American Stamp Act were likely the most
significant contributor to its failure. To enforce collection practices across the vast
Atlantic through eighteenth-century communication lines would have proved challenging
for any empire. Although the Act was short-lived, its impact was long felt and had a
major impact on the English-American relationship.97
The cost of implementation was extremely complicated. The paper and stamps
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Britain would tax were, at least initially, to be manufactured in London and shipped to
the colonies for distribution.98 The various types of paper and stamps, in combination
with the dyes and royal stamps representing different amounts proved difficult. The
British government viewed America as a single entity and appeared ignorant of the very
different economic statuses of the various regions and colonies.99 Would parchment be
sent to one area of the colonies primarily while paper blanks and printing paper to
another? Was there to be an inventory on hand or might it be produced as needed in the
colonies? Did the crown need to establish warehouses both in London and the colonies
to provide the colonies with the necessary materials and how would the logistical cost be
absorbed through the levy?100
In Europe, a stamp duty had been in place for quite some time, and most countries
had the ability to support it.101 This may have been one of many motivating factors in
working towards instituting a stamp duty in North America, as the British had seen it
work throughout Europe. The sale of stamps for legal paper, bonds, playing cards, and
other items had been implemented in England during William III and proved seamless.102
In the Americas, however, only three colonies had previously instituted stamp duties on
their own, and thus, had the equipment to support the production of such paper.103 One
colony was New York. Without this equipment, England would force not only an
unwanted tax on its subordinate colonies but would also require the taxed to absorb the
procurement cost of such equipment. By keeping the production and warehousing of
98
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taxed paper materials internal to England, it would also employ English workers, which
further heightened animosities with colonists. Had the colonies been able to serve in the
production, storage, and paid employment of a stamp duty, it may have been better
received.104
For collection practices, Great Britain divided the colonies into nine districts, and
the American Stamp Office was established under five commissioners in London.105 The
districts were then subdivided into smaller sub-districts and assigned a stamp distributor.
Eighteenth-century New York was an extremely busy place. Printing production was big
business within New York City, its harbor a constant entry and departure of mariners, and
manufacturing throughout the colony was consistently witnessing growth.106
Great Britain assigned James McEvers to the colonial capital of New York as the
excise service distributor.107 Of the twenty-three smaller districts, New York was a close
second in size only to Jamaica. The British Empire relied heavily on the Caribbean
market both in shipping and production of molasses, rum, and slaves.108 Parliament
entrusted McEvers with the storage and distribution of stamped paper, levying and
enforcing the tax, and dispatching the collected funds to the Exchequer in Great Britain.
This British commission proved no small feat in the busiest colonial district in regards to
all things stamp related.109
With his cooperation, the British government compensated McEvers eight percent
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commission of duties collected as well as expenses related to postage and official travel.
Having been responsible for the Hudson Valley, McEvers certainly had the opportunity
to do very well for himself if he had procured collections as legislation prescribed.110 His
true loyalty to the Exchequer and British crown at the time of assuming his post is
unclear, however. In eighteenth-century America, men accepted various posts to promote
their name and position within society. Many men sought an opportunity to serve as
distributors, which further shows the issues that rose from the Stamp Act crisis had not
been accurately forecasted. McEvers was no different from these other men, yet later
found his position was much more dangerous than envisioned upon its acceptance.111
As mentioned previously, remittance was to be made in the form of sterling.
However, whether the sterling was to be kept internal to fund the British Army within the
colonies or shipped back to the British Exchequer and then disturbed accordingly was to
be decided. Draining the already low stock of sterling was a serious concern of the
colonies and its economic impact and social reaction to the American Stamp Act.112
The British representatives responsible for the collection of the tax put
complicated accounting mechanisms into place. After some debate, Parliament made the
decision the collected sterling would remain within the colonies and be paid directly to
the deputy paymaster of the army in America.113 Additionally, they were responsible for
decisions regarding what accounts to British forces stationed in North America were paid
and its distribution methods. Allocations of the tax puzzled colonists, and although the
duties claimed to support the British Army, Americans felt Parliament appropriated the
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funds however it deemed fit. If it were to fund British troops in North America, why
would it leave the continent? Once established that it would remain in North America,
did the British government intend to shift other resources to fool Americans? There
remained a significant distrust of British intentions surrounding the Act. Whether to fund
other aspects of the British government, pay for colonial defense, or to even entice
rebellion were the question many Americans began to ask of the duty.114
Stamp duties had served as an effective collection strategy in England in the past,
but as tensions between colonials and the British Army continued to be strained, the
thought of funding their salaries and garrisons was difficult for Americans. Having
undergone the strain of the Sugar Act of 1764 which levied taxes on wines, sugar, and
coffee, the Currency Act of 1764 which had a significant impact on American currency,
and the Quartering Act of 175 which required food, lodging, and aid be provided to
British soldiers, the Stamp Act was, in colonial eyes, Britain's attempt to undermine their
growing economy, independence, and while funding the British Army.
Grenville, the Office of the Exchequer, British Parliament, and the Crown all had
their various rationales in support of a stamp duty as a fiscal instrument to opinions on
the methods of revenue collection from those living in the Americas. How Great Britain
would implement the duty and enforce collection practices was simply not a seamless
process. The accounting techniques used had previously worked in Europe, but the
dynamics seen in America were unlike anything Europeans had encountered.115 The
enforcement and maintenance due to colonial pressure were turbulent, disorderly, and
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chaotic. What stemmed from the Stamp Act catapulted America from relative social
order into near anarchy and set into motion its vehicle for independence.116
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CHAPTER TWO: RESISTANCE THROUGH VIOLENCE
“Caesar had his Brutus, Charles the first had his Cromwell, and George the Third- may
profit from their example. If this be treason, make the most of it.”
-Patrick Henry, Speech in the House of Burgesses, May 29th, 1765
Violence as a Political Tool
The first protests against the Stamp Act took the form of pamphlets. Circulated
pamphlets had typically been the most popular way to object to legislation, parliament,
colonial government, or the British crown. They were published against and in defense
of the American Stamp Act, but these words did little for those impacted the most by the
tax. Affluent colonists educated in the arts, law, and philosophy, were the primary
authors of these pamphlets. Those pamphlets were typically adequate to generate a
variety of feelings and opinions simply, but little more. Communicating through
appropriate channels and writing pamphlets had worked in the past, but the Stamp Act
produced a new version of diplomacy: the mob.1
Using violence as a political tool was not a new concept to American colonists.2
Riots and mobs have served as important political tools throughout American history,
both before the 1760’s and the years following its independence. The first North
American settlements experienced violent uprisings, laborers, farmers, and slaves have
revolted against their masters and destroyed property, while most major cities witnessed
unrest.3 All facets of American society have been subjected to violence as a political
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tool, and it should not be surprising mob action would serve as a “necessary ingredient”
of revolutionary thought.4
Having felt unrepresented and with the inception of the Stamp Act and its
corresponding duties authorized, lay people felt they had few options.5 It was apparent
the British government would not entertain colonial interests and hold the empire’s
bottom line as its primary concern. Mobs during the Stamp Act crisis varied in intensity,
makeup, and intent regardless of size. However, what Americans shared was their
disdain toward the Act and explicit targeting of the customs officers who participated in
its collection.6
Great Britain had spent much of the eighteenth century at war in multiple theatres,
but bloodshed between colonists and the British Army had been relatively absent. The
American colonies remained loosely affiliated and – except for trade – cooperation
between them had not been present. 7 To challenge the might of the greatest military
power on earth, by most accounts, would have been ill-advised. Instead, Americans
enjoyed the protection of the British government and had hoped to maintain their
arrangement. However, the duties collected through the Stamp Act would ensure
Americans would now participate in funding their protection.
Mass violence and mob activities, however, are the first examples of armed
resistance specific to the fight for American independence.8 Gatherings of individuals
that exploded into violent mobs played a dominant role early on, years before the
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Continental Army marched onto the battlefield. "Mobs terrified the stamp agents into
resigning and forced a repeal of the tax. Mobs obstructed the execution of the
Townshend Revenue Act and backed up the boycotts of British trade. Mobs triggered the
Boston Massacre and later the famous Tea Party."9 As seen in America, violence was
now the by-product of failed diplomacy.
Mobs began to scheme and gather once word of the Stamp Act reached American
port cities. Some were choreographed and others unrehearsed, but both kinds shared
intensity. Rural areas were not immune from organized resistance either, but most
occurred in urban areas. Cables of communication were slow outside cultural centers
such as Boston and New York City, but collection occurred in all areas of the colonies.10
Mobs during both the Stamp Act crisis and in the greater context of the American
Revolution were important for several reasons. First, mobs conveyed what written words
simply could not, and highlighted the two-sided position that surrounded the ideas of
virtual representation and the rights of taxation. Second, mobs established a certain level
of fear among those who supported and defended Parliament’s actions and the agents
within American in support roles. Mobs made loyalists uneasy, and the once sought-after
position of an excise officer extremely dangerous. Last, it provided the opportunity for
any individual to become a hero and a name to be rallied around.11 Often those
individuals lost their lives in mob-assisted opposition but brought the resistance to the
sailors, merchants, farmers, and the general person who suffered the clutch of the Stamp
Act.
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The eighteenth-century colony of New York was unique due to its size and
makeup. New York City had become a major center of commerce, shipping, printing,
and manufacturing. Hundreds of miles to the west lay the Niagara frontier and in
between, production of textiles and raw materials, farming, mining, and trade expanded.
Although New York’s economy spanned across various industries, the colony shared the
burden of the Stamp tax.12 New York had experimented with its own Stamp Act two
decades prior, but the temperature of its citizens regarding the now imposed British Act
was much different.13

Organized Resistance in Upstate New York
Opposition to the Stamp Act in New York was not seen only in New York City.
The municipality, because of its size and importance, often overshadowed the rest of the
colony. However, in viewing the colony during the Stamp Act crisis, upstate New York
provides essential insight into the rural perception of the collection practices, mob
mentality, and impact on those living outside major cities.
Much of what happened in places such as Albany and western New York had
occurred in New York City already. Not only was New York City the center of New
York’s commerce, but also the capital city in 1765. The initial response from the Stamp
Act upstate was quiet until assemblymen returned to their constituency following its
passing by British Parliament.14 Non-importation agreements were signed and both
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political parties within New York refused to support the Stamp Act.15 Opposition in
western New York was not entirely unanimous but in locations like Albany, pockets of
dissent existed.16
To rise from the depths of society and achieve greater status and notoriety, many
men sought a commission as an excise officer. In Albany, seven men had applied for the
position. When colonial politicians had returned to Albany and distributed information
on the now very unpopular Stamp Act, the applicants’ tone changed dramatically. “Four
[of the applicants], John Macaomb, William Gamble, John Stevenson and Philip Cuyler,
admitted applying for the position but promised never to serve in it. The other three, a
Mr. Hansen, Jacob Vanderheyden and Henry Van Schaack, denied ever having
applied.”17 The fear of reprisal for accepting such a post was a harsh reality these
applicants faced. The Sons of Liberty had a dominant presence in Albany and demanded
the men sign agreements to refuse these posts if appointed.
The British Army had garrisoned troops throughout the colony of New York,
including Albany. If garrisons in Albany proved inadequate to afford protection to stamp
collectors, troops in New York City were within marching distance. Even with the
availability and under the protection of the British Army, constant harassment of customs
officials occurred across the colony. Prior to the November 1st, 1765 enactment date,
aggression towards collectors and supporters continued. “Illegal actions of the Son of
Liberty and the negligent conduct of the authorities demonstrated the unity of the
opposition to the Stamp Act, both as to purpose and as to methods.”18
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Mob actions across the colonies were typical in execution. Of these, burning
down the homes or properties of collectors often took place. Van Schaack wrote to the
law officers appointed by the British crown and the provincial attorney general detailing
individuals appearing to have been the instigators of the mob that torched his home. By
his account, Albany County representatives were responsible for organizing the mob,
naming 36 individuals having been involved in the torching of his home.19 Whether Van
Schaack’s account is entirely accurate is debatable, but it indeed questions upstate
representatives and their participation with the mobs and Sons of Liberty.
Due to the nature of the Stamp Act and what it taxed, Albany and New York City
reacted differently than the rest of the colony for several reasons. Those living in rural
areas conducted most of its business through a barter system and in luxuries not typically
associated with items affected by the Stamp Act.20 Troops garrisoned on the frontier
were much different from those in New York City as well. They wore the same British
uniform but occupied their posts due to the Indian threat and post-war relations with
French Canadians. Their secondary objective was the enforcement of commercial and
legislative matters.21 The British troops garrisoned in western New York required
different operating procedures due to the distance from the primary colonial garrisons in
New York City.
Because of the differences, neither Albany nor New York garnered much support
from their rural neighbors.22 According to historian Gary Nash, “… the backcountry
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farmers believe[d] that those same charges applied to corrupt and exploitative fellow
colonists in their midst who controlled the courts, credit networks, and distribution of
land.”23 Much of the land in New York was owned by a select group of aristocrats and
those who worked the land were tenant farmers, more concerned with their lease to
continue crop production than problems of politics seemingly affecting a higher caste of
society.24
As Stamp Act hostilities grew in urban areas, British troops shifted from the
western part of the colony to the eastern seaboard. Before the Stamp Act, the British
Army had posted most of their New York garrisons in western New York to defend
against Native Americans while protecting British interests from uprisings of tenant
farmers.25 Tensions in New York continued to rise as the British Army and General
Gage, commander of British forces in America, struggled to enforce the terms of the
Quartering Act (enacted in 1765) and a shift in forces required British forces to move out
of the Hudson Valley and into New York City.26
Without a doubt, lawyers were involved in lease agreements between landowners
and tenants, and with that, legal documents generated would require to be stamped in
accordance with Parliamentary law but not in numbers seen throughout major cities
during the 1760’s. Although instrumental later in the War for American Independence,
upstate New York saw limited action directly related to the Stamp Act. However, the
Sons of Liberty had strong roots in the Hudson Valley, from Westchester County to
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Albany, due to the imposition of Stamp Act, and these will be addressed later in this
study.27

Organized Resistance in New York City
The clear majority of Stamp Act related hostilities within the colony of New York
took place within the greater New York City area.28 The city was growing rapidly and
due to its location between greater New England, the western frontier, and the middle and
southern states, it was an ideal location for nearly all types of trades and industries.
Because of the nature of the Stamp Act and the variety of individuals it affected, it was
not well-received and political parties, labor unions, skilled and unskilled workers, and
merchants all showed some degree of pushback once its implementation was enforced.29
New York, in comparison to other metropolitan areas in New England, did maintain a
group of Tory loyalists but had become progressively more dangerous for an outspoken
supporter of royal policy.30
The port in New York City had grown to be one of the busiest commerce centers
in North America during the late 18th century.31 The growing volume of commerce
exchanged in New York City would now be regulated through stamp legislation and had
a sizable impact on the shipping, manufacturing, and maritime industries. Many New
York merchants banded together in economic opposition to the Stamp Act, primarily
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through measures that did not harm or curb their business ventures. 32
As tensions in New York City rose, prominent merchants led and created nonimportation associations and committees of correspondence.33 Most merchants saw little
harm in organized opposition to the stamp duty but as tensions became violent, many
neutral merchants pulled their support for fear they might lose their livelihood.34 New
York City experienced a division of support in the 1760s when organized demonstrations
became mobs resulting in a division into conservative and radical parties.35 Early
twentieth century historian Virginia Harrington describes the decision some New Yorkers
were forced to make with their support, “Many merchants, it is true, continued to stand
with the radicals— those who saw more clearly the danger to trade from British tax
action than the danger to private property from violence—but the majority stood with the
conservatives, opposing the acts of Parliament as specific measures, but even more
opposed to violent methods of all kinds and somewhat jealous also of the presumption of
the unenfranchised classes.”36
Shipping during this period was the most profitable and sensible option to
transport goods, not only throughout the Atlantic World but also through other ports in
North America. Once the goods passed through colonial harbors, inland merchants and
shippers distributed the goods over land. No major road system or railroads existed yet
and seafarers were responsible for ensuring goods produced both in New England and
abroad reached their destinations across the world. Because of the amount of business
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and commerce located in New York City, captains and seaman often found themselves in
the port of New York.37
The Royal Navy had a tradition of impressment— that is the kidnapping of sailors
and forcing them to serve in the British Navy or aboard ships flying the King’s flag.38
This study is not focused on issues of impressment, but it should be noted sailors and
merchant marines had a particular distrust for the English and continued cynicism was
seen throughout the majority of the eighteenth century. Whether the Royal Navy or those
civilian agencies that cooperated with it directly or indirectly victimized American
sailors, colonists suffered from a deep-rooted distrust of the British crown and its Naval
Forces.39 The New York Stamp Act riots, in and around the city, were organized and
orchestrated, in many instances, by sailors.40 Port cities, such as New York, were filled
with idle sailors who had now found themselves unemployed. Many had served as
privateers during the war with France, and due to British regulation, now were out of
work and blamed new legislation and the Stamp Act specifically.41 According to
Morgan, "Idle sailors were a problem in every port, but the bigger the port, the bigger the
problem."42
The Stamp Act states clearance papers issued after November 1st would bear a
stamp, and in anticipation, sailors and merchants in New York City were on high alert in
October anticipating how customs officers would enforce it. If the customs officers
chose to comply with the law, and as royal officials, it was expected they would comply,
37
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what action did layman or even the colonial assemblies take? "The duties of customs
officers did not fall within their jurisdictions, and royal governors would certainly have
vetoed any orders from the assemblies which attempted to regulate matters beyond their
authority."43
In October of 1765, merchants, sailors, and printers in opposition to the
impending Act began to post warnings and placards throughout the city collectively. On
October 24th, the stamps arrived by ship into the New York Harbor and were met with
placards warning, "The First Man that either distributes or makes use of Stampt Paper let
him take Care of his House, Person, and Effects. We dare. VOX POPULI. [Latin phrase
meaning voice of the people]”44 Further study into various forms of print will be later
covered, but this is simply one example in the efforts individuals took as a collective to
ensure their voices were heard and how they intended to single out those who encouraged
the implementation, collection, or support of the quickly approaching enforceable
legislation.
On October 31st, the day prior to the Stamp Act effective date, undertones of
sorrow and rage were felt throughout New York City.45 Many merchants agreed they
would avoid the importation of any English goods until Parliament repealed the Stamp
Act.46 However, there were those loyal to the British crown or afraid to avoid the tax and
a unanimous movement was not present. A collection of merchants gathered at Burns’
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City Arms Tavern and resolved to import no more goods from the mother country while
the Stamp Act remained in force.47
Even with the non-importation agreement between New York merchants, critics
were not satisfied. The city erupted into chaos when two thousand individuals from the
lower classes filled the streets and threatened the homes of British policy sympathizers.
In one of the most famous early examples of the mob’s actions during the war, the crowd
descended on Governor Cadwallader Colden’s estate.48 The tactics these gangs used
varied. In this instance, they ransacked his house, marched an effigy in the likeness of
the Governor through the streets, and set his carriage ablaze. The mob moved as one
through New York City for four days, which was later called the “General Terror of
November 1-4.”49 The middle-class Sons of Liberty orchestrated these four days of
protests and in some cases, incited violence on collectors, comptrollers, excise officers,
and even royal sympathizers.50
The mariners living in or transiting through the city also had an opportunity to
organize. "The Sons of Neptune" as they called themselves posted flyers throughout the
city urging individuals to join their resistance movement, and on November 1st, 1765,
New York’s seaman left their ships at the docks and descended into Manhattan.51 These
sailors hung placards throughout the city encouraging participation in the picketing and
storming of the city’s British garrison, Fort George. The mob shouted to Cadwallader

47

Mercantile Library, “New York During the American Revolution,” 6.
Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, 54-55.
49
Ibid., 55.
50
Ibid.
51
George Bancroft, History of the United States of America (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1967), 161.
48

42

through the walls of the barracks calling him, “The Chief Murderer of their Rights and
Privileges” and “taunted the guards to fire, hurled bricks, stones, and garbage, paraded an
effigy of the governor in his actual coach, which they had seized from his carriage house,
and finally convinced the governor to hand over bundles of the hated stamps.”52
Throughout the remainder of the month, contending groups continued to harass
those willing to risk their property, reputation, or even lives in royal services associated
with collecting or distributing stamps in the different boroughs of New York City.
During November of 1765, the New York Gazette reported, “a crowd surround[ed] the
home of a suspected stamp distributor and defac[ed] his house, destroy[ed] some
furniture in it, and draw[ed] his winter carriages thro’ the streets in flames.”53 By the end
of November, the mobs had flushed out nearly all officers commissioned to distribute
stamps in New York City.54
Britain had achieved something it had not intended in 1765 with the passage of
the Stamp Act: the unintentional creation of a loose network of colonies and people that
shared a common enemy and were forced to become closer than they ever had in the
past.55 In the coming years, there were evident growing pains due to America’s unique
geography, developing economies, melting pot like diversities, and social differences.
However, Americans shared the economic implications of the Stamp Act across all social
lines. New Yorkers, whether city dwellers or rural farmers, shouldered a shared burden
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and American colonists had begun to view themselves as American citizens.56 Americans
who had not previously been heard now had a voice, and by the conclusion of 1765, those
who took to the streets had stunned, intimidated, and terrified those who continued to
remain loyal to British Parliament and Crown.57
Colonial grievances had finally culminated into an articulated response, what they
believed, as Great Britain's attempt to undermined their economic strength and
independence. New York City remained one of the pillars of organized resistance during
both the Stamp Act crisis and the American Revolution. Other colonies looked to
colonial leaders in New York City for the best methods of opposition and organization.
The Committee of Correspondence, formed on October 31st, 1765 at Burns' City Arms
Tavern, days before the Stamp Act's implementation, offered passion, guidance, and
energy to other cities and colonies on resistance to the Act and the way forward for
America.58
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CHAPTER THREE: RESISTANCE THROUGH PRINT
“The records of thirteen legislatures, the pamphlets, newspapers in all the colonies,
ought to be consulted during that period to ascertain the steps by which the public
opinion was enlightened and informed concerning the authority of Parliament over the
colonies.”
-John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, 1815
Pamphlets
The written word has been used to counter arguments throughout history and the
revolutionary period in American continued this tradition. Both Americans and
Europeans utilized every medium possible to state their opinions and with the
proliferation of the printing press, their audience was nearly unlimited. One of the most
effective mediums of the eighteenth century was the pamphlet.1 “These small, loosely
stitched and unbound booklets contained some of the most important and characteristic
writings during the American Revolutionary period.”2
The pamphlets have always maintained obvious differences from colonial
newspapers. Typically, they reflected one individual’s thoughts and may express
discontent. They did not need to appeal to the masses like newspapers must and could
allow either a single edition or a series of offerings. Because of these properties and the
tendencies to be very passionate in their message, pamphlets functioned as the perfect
mouthpiece for dissatisfaction throughout colonial America.
According to Bailyn, pamphlets were “highly flexible, easy to manufacture,
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cheap, [and] were printed in the American colonies wherever there were printing presses,
intellectual ambitions, and political concerns.”3 It is difficult to determine how many
pamphlets Americans produced before and during the American Revolution, but
estimates range from 530 to 1,500. 4 However, the Stamp Act set into motion the first
wave of pamphlets North America witnessed in the eighteenth century.
Until the invention of the radio, print was the typical vehicle to spread propaganda
and the press became very effective in its use. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth
century, the pamphlet was the chief instrument to carry one's ideas to the public. The
pamphlet, forerunner of the newspaper, was adapted into many forms and uses and due to
its small size, cheap cost, and portability, it could reach "a larger audience than the orator
in the House of Commons."5 Even after the mass production and later acceptance of the
newspaper, pamphlet style writing was published in editorials but carried its grassroots
message.
American political thought shares roots with these short works. Often pamphlets
would be written and distributed only to inspire a response, rebuttal, or counter-argument
pamphlet.6 To author a pamphlet or broadside, one did not need to come from the elite
class, practice law, or make a living by writing. Early American pamphleteers were the
original American historians, originating from all societal castes and occupations, and
collectively shared an impact on constitutional thought on the eve of American
Independence.
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Americans were not the only authors of pamphlets concerning the subject of
taxation. The citizens and government of Great Britain also participated in producing a
small number of pamphlets related to issues over the opposition and defense of their
stamp duty.7 However, most of the pamphlets originating during this period emanated
from the colonies. Following the Stamp Act crisis until late 1774 and early 1775, British
loyalists had dismissed the tax opposition movement as unimportant while viewing their
protests and constitutional disputes as not worthy of the effort of refutation.8
Many pamphleteers did not claim authorship of their work. In fact, many
Americans believed Grenville himself either published or commissioned the writing of a
pro-tax pamphlet entitled The Regulations Lately Made concerning the Colonies and the
Taxes Imposed upon Them, considered.9 Authors would either assume pseudonyms or
claim the works they had commissioned. Thomas Whately, the author of the Stamp Act,
was likely the author of the pro-tax pamphlet and was written to represent Grenville’s
views on the matter in an effort to curb American opinion.10
The opinions on the Stamp Act in New York City were as diverse as the makeup
of its inhabitants. Some of these citizens seized the opportunity to publish their opinions
in pamphlets of their opinions of Grenville, the right for Parliament to impose an external
tax while they did not possess physical representation in England, and the practices of
officers within the British customs office. New York elites also utilized pseudonyms and
published works by printers and booksellers and the pamphlets represented the lifeblood
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of American public opinion and resistance during the American Revolution.11
Early American pamphlets played a substantial impact during the decade before
the Declaration of Independence due to the unpopular actions of the British government.12
The numbers of produced and manufactured pamphlets had substantially risen indicating
both their popularity and effectiveness. Although the numbers are not as extraordinary as
they would become later such as Thomas Paine’s Common Sense (100,000 copies sold in
the first three months, and about 500,000 altogether), their importance is worthy of
discussion. 13 Without the early revolutionary thought-provoking events surrounding the
Stamp Act, pamphleteering may have proven less effective when its results were much
more important during the later years of the 1760's and 1770's.

Placards and Broadsides
Placards and broadsides also served an essential role in the printed opposition of
the Stamp Act. Similar to pamphlets, broadsides or placards had been used for many
years as an effective way to broadcast an opinion on a subject matter that would reach the
masses. Many of these placards have likely been lost, destroyed, or simply did not
survive the test of time and are difficult to analyze. Both pamphlets and placards were
significant as they highlighted the expansion of intellectual and political thought in
America while also exhibiting the evolution of revolutionary philosophy before and
during the American Revolution.14
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The one-sheet broadsides that appeared in 18th century American cities were the
most important communication avenue to keep colonists informed of local events and in
some cases, hundreds of miles away. 15 Because they were inexpensive to produce and
distribution methods were simple, placards quickly became the most effective way to
quickly educate the masses on distrust and discontent surrounding the Stamp Act and
British government. The reaction time colonist required to write, produce, and distribute
placards following the events of their subject matter was also impressive.
The Stamp Act Congress, meeting from Oct 7th to Oct 24th, 1765, encouraged the
citizens of New York City to act. The initial reaction from the American body was
temperate and respectful. 16 However, the subsequent response to the impending
implementation of the Stamp Act on Nov 1st was one that began to simmer. On Oct 22nd,
the Stamps arrived in New York City Harbor on the HMS Edward and escorted by the
frigates Coventry and Garland.17 As the British ships settled into the harbor to unload
British approved stamps, placards appeared throughout New York City announcing the
popular determination to reject the duty and threatened violence against any of those who
attempted to distribute or enforce the stamps.18
The use of placards and broadsides is an important point of liberal thought in
American history, both within the colony of New York and elsewhere. As colonists
began to think and write as Americans, placards and broadsides were their mouthpieces.
Those opinions unquestionably had an impact in the future of American philosophy as
they became the easiest and most cost-effective way to not only share opinions but
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developed into the preferred method to inform citizens of time-sensitive events that
required anonymous reporting.
Anti-stamp act rhetoric was not the only use of these single page reports. As print
became more acceptable and affordable, so did the diversity of opinions Americans wrote
and distributed. Additionally, there were three dozen newspaper printers in the American
mainland colonies at the start of the Revolution, each producing a four-page issue every
week. 19 These weekly papers, or one-sheet broadsides that appeared in American cities
even more frequently, were the most important communication avenue to keep colonists
informed of events occurring hundreds of miles away.20
Placards and broadsides continued to grow in popularity for another reason;
distribution methods did not require costly overhead and the evasion of stamp duties was
much more simplistic. Newspapers reached a wide range of individuals but the
distribution methods required for a successful title necessitated the confrontation of
excise officials. Affordable print became increasingly popular as technology improved
and while European governments taxed newspapers and other publications, America had
remained relatively immune until the Stamp Act.21 In fact, according to Princeton
University Professor Dr. Paul Starr, “the Stamp Act crisis during the Revolutionary era
left behind a distinct bias against any special taxes on the press,” and future attempts to
enforce a duty on printed material would prove unsuccessful.22
The Sons of Liberty later used placards, newspapers and posted broadsides
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extensively to communicate their agenda and anti-British sentiment developed by their
Committees of Correspondence. It was not unusual following a Sons of Liberty
gathering to observe a meeting notice or proposed, referred, or passed resolutions in
taverns, meeting places, or city centers throughout America.
The Stamp Act crisis was not the first-time Americans utilized placards or
broadsides, but it is important to point out their use during this time. During the mid1760’s, Americans had observed the importance of distributing a rapid and easy method
to communicate. These placards and broadsides provided a network of communications
with one another through cities, colonies and occasionally, throughout the entirety of
North America.23 Due to the volatile and delicate nature of the thirteen American
colonies and the British government, pamphlets, placards, and broadsides formed the
connection required to frame a continental communication network.24

Newspapers
Before 1765, newspapers were relatively unimportant as agencies for molding and
reporting public opinion.25 However, as the printing press became more accessible, so
did the range of opinions it printed. The popularity of the newspaper continued to grow
during the 1760’s, through the 1770’s, and by 1775, there were thirty-eight newspapers in
the mainland colonies. 26 These new publications became crowded with columns of
arguments and counter-arguments appearing as letters, official documents, extracts of
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speeches, and sermons.27
The writing style and content found in the colonial press was much different than
what is published in modern newspapers. Due to the structure of the newspaper business
in the 18th century, the material that appeared in each paper was “exchanged” from other
papers in different cities, creating a uniform effect similar to a modern newswire.28 The
exchange system allowed the same story to appear across North America and provided
the Revolutionaries with a method to shore up a fragile sense of unity. It is difficult to
imagine American independence—as a popular idea, let alone an impact on policy
decisions—without understanding the importance of print and its effect on colonial
America in the mid-18th century.29 The eighteenth-century newspaper effectively
bridged gaps in geography, assisted in the spread of information, and contributed to an
independence movement network.
In establishing American independence, the pen and press had merit equal to that
of the sword.30 In the 1760’s, print became a contested cause of imperial reform.
Parliament focused its attention on the printed word as the center of the constitutional
debate over the colonies’ place in the empire and their responsibility in sharing tax
burdens.31 If Britain asserted its authority on American print, the Excise Service required
a focus on New York City as publishing efforts continued to grow with the city’s industry
and population.
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In an attempt to avoid the use of stamps, several newspapers suspended
publication after the Nov 1st implementation of the Stamp Act, while most printers
continued business as usual and ignored the requirement that news sheets be stamped.32
The Sons of Liberty also played an essential role in the printing of newspapers by
threatening violence upon any editor that would stop printing or refused to publish their
pieces. John Holt, printer of the New York Gazette, received a warning on October 31st
stating, "should you at this critical time shut up the press, and basely desert us, depend
upon it, your house, person and effects, will be in imminent danger. We shall, therefore,
expect your paper on Thursday as usual…"33 Newspapers throughout America continued
to spout rhetoric focused on not only the Stamp Act but also stamp distributors and proBritish officials including Governor Bernard, Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson of
Massachusetts, and even George Grenville.34
The Stamp Act and colonial resistance politicized print and printers in new ways.
For the remainder of the imperial crisis, print remained at the center of the colonial
resistance movement, connecting disparate resistance groups to one another, and
providing the most reliable communications network across the Atlantic world.35
Newspapers, pamphlets, and broadsides were, indeed, the lifeblood of American
resistance. Because of the unstable and fragile notions of unity among the thirteen
mainland American colonies, print acted as a binding agent that mitigated the chances
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that the colonies would not support one another when war with Britain broke out in
1775.36
The response from newspapers to the Stamp Act varied as much as the opinions
of those reading their publications. The New York Gazette temporarily suspended its
periodicals after June 10th, 1765 and resumed regular production on November 25th,
having published three unplanned issues during the period.37 Publications in Albany,
Hudson, Poughkeepsie, and Schenectady, NY were all slow to produce periodicals until
after the American Revolutionary period.38 The Niagara Frontier showed little progress
in generating newspapers until the 19th century.
Imposing a tax on newspapers also had an anticipated effect on Americans to
conduct business and obtain property. Eighteenth-century newspapers were a vehicle to
reach the broadest audience possible. Colonists in both rural and urban areas relied
heavily upon print to market goods and insurance and to announce auctions and
foreclosures.39 By statute, court-sponsored foreclosures of debtor's assets such as land
and slaves were required to be advertised in newspapers.40 Broadsides and posters found
throughout eighteenth-century cities were a frequent sight, but the audience the
newspaper attracted was difficult to surpass. The importance of the newspaper shared a
direct impact on colonial markets due to the number of subscribers and the merchants and
auction houses who utilized them for advertisement. 41
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Additionally, the levy would also challenge the ability to petition local, colonial,
and parliamentary government officials, thus making written opposition less common.
By slowing colonial appeals while simultaneously funding the British Army in North
America the Stamp Act was designed to fund, it served as the vehicle for radical change
and British imposition into colonial public opinion, business, and life.
Providence, Philadelphia, Charleston, Boston and New York City all joined the
cause in various ways, either by becoming members of the Sons of Liberty, opening their
print shops for political meetings, or publishing a wide array of stories, essays, and items
that supported revolutionary thought.42 Anonymity was vital in authoring anti-British
sentiment during the revolutionary era, and many writers assumed pseudonym to avoid
being targeted by authorities. John Holt, one of New York's most prominent publishers
was responsible for authoring, and printing, pro-revolutionary newspapers that found
their way throughout New York.43
New York was, however, home to many British loyalist and newspapers found a
way to market to them as well. Hugh Gaine’s New York Gazette & Weekly Mercury and
James Rivington’s New York Gazette were both known to be the leading Tory prints
within the colonies. Like many eighteenth-century printers, their financial interests
dominated whom they would market their writings to. Gaines, who had been printing a
newspaper in New York since 1752, soiled his name with revolutionaries when he began
to publish pro-British periodicals that found their way throughout North America during
the Stamp Act crisis and well into the later part of the eighteenth century.44 Newspapers

42

Parkinson, “Print, the Press,” 5-6.
Ibid., 10.
44
Ibid.
43

55

and pamphlets had their most significant impact on American history during the years of
1765-1766, 1768-1769, and 1774-1776.45 These years mark major events leading up to
and including the American Revolution while written arguments and the actions of others
influence both American and British citizens.
Historian Bernard Bailyn writes, "The opponents of the Revolution… were as
convinced as were the leaders of the Revolutionary movement that they were themselves
the victims of conspirational designs. Officials in the colonies and their superiors in
England were persuaded as the crisis deepened that they were confronted by an active
conspiracy of intriguing men whose professions masked their true intentions.”46 The
Stamp Act had larger implications and motivations than merely raising revenue for Great
Britain. By levying an additional tax on pamphlets, newspapers, legal documents, and
even the advertisements that publishers profited from, the Stamp Act made it much more
difficult for anti-government public opinion to reach a broad audience and curb dissent
among colonial Americans.47
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CHAPTER FOUR: NEW YORK’S IMPACT
“Planted by your care? No! Your oppression planted them in America… Nourished by
your indulgence? They grew by your neglect of them… As soon as you began to care
about them that care was exercised in sending person to rule over them… Men whose
behavior on many occasions has caused the blood of those sons of liberty to recoil within
them.”
-Colonel Isaac Barre, British Member of Parliament, February 6th, 1765
Sons of Liberty
During the early stages of the Stamp Act disturbances, ordinary people, chiefly
mechanics and artisans from many different crafts, united together to call for the
boycotting of British goods in several colonial ports in 1765 and formed a network of
revolutionaries referred to as the Sons of Liberty.1 The Sons of Liberty executed their
resistance measures through a wide range of methods including written and verbal
messages, organized gatherings, and even violent actions targeted toward British
supporters and officials.
The Sons of Liberty maintained a presence from South Carolina to New
Hampshire and derived their name from a well-publicized speech that American
sympathizer, Colonel Isaac Barre presented to the British Parliament.2 Barre, both British
Army Officer and member of Parliament, felt the Stamp Act would have significant
repercussions on the relationship between the American colonies and Great Britain.
Many of the same arguments Barre made to Parliament were the same opinions the Sons
of Liberty shared. In Barre's powerful speech to his fellow members, he points to
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Parliament as negligent in the care of the colonies. An American battle anthem of sorts,
his words point to the British as oppressive to Americans and that they had left Britain for
good cause. The Stamp Act would only further divide the two and it would likely end in
their separation.3
It was in New York City that these radicals involved in resistance claimed the
name as their own while encouraging other like-minded groups throughout the colonies
to utilize as well. Smaller factions throughout North America looked upon the Sons of
Liberty in New York and Boston as a beacon of liberty and revolutionary example
worthy of following.
Crowd action during the pre-revolutionary period varied in intensity. These
gatherings were sometimes orchestrated and other times impromptu in response to
actions taken by colonial governors or British troops. According to historian Edward
Countryman, “Disguises, effigies, tarring and feathering, bonfires, even tearing down
houses were all well understood in the eighteenth-century world, and colonials turned to
them because they were familiar acts.”4 Britons and Americans viewed these actions in
New York as intense, full of passion and rooted in the colonial argument against the
Stamp Act during this period and through the revolution.
The rationale and justification of these actions by the Sons of Liberty were
simple. They had discovered a method to prevent the collection of taxes through the
intimidation of tax collectors while simultaneously utilizing violence as a political tool.
Although from different backgrounds and tradecraft, artisans and intercontinental
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merchants in New York City had a great deal in common as they faced the imperial
crisis.5 Their primary focus was to produce a robust American economy while
simultaneously ensuring the British government would not compromise colonial rights
and privileges.
Preparations for the reception of the stamps in New York led to Lt Governor
Colden requesting General Thomas Gage garrison additional troops at Fort George, in
Manhattan, to protect British interests and serve as a repository for the inbound stamps.6
There was no armed resistance by the Sons of Liberty until October 23rd, 1765, just
weeks prior to Britain's implementation, when a ship carrying the stamped papers arrived
in the New York harbor. New York, one of America’s busiest ports, typically had idle,
patriotic, often drunken, sailors present. Two thousand colonists, led by the Sons of
Liberty, met the ship at the pier and although agitated and ready for confrontation,
remained non-violent.
However, on October 31st, a large mob formed in the streets near Fort George
breaking lamps and windows and threatening British supporters and politicians that they
would “pull down their houses,” if the Act were to be enforced.7 Ignoring the Sons’
claims, Captain Archibald Kennedy of the HMS Coventry reported 2,000 angry colonists
had assembled at Fort George and had hung the effigy of Lt Governor Colden.8 The
crowd continued as they dragged the effigy throughout New York City firing pistols and
making a loud disturbance throughout the streets.9 Returning to Fort George, the mob
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banged at the gate and began to throw bricks and stones at the British regulars and fort. 10
British historian Christopher Hibbert writes about the following day, “In New
York on Nov 1st, 1765, when the Stamp Act was about to take effect and flags were
flown at half-mast in mourning for the death of American liberty, a large crowd,
[composed of Sons of Liberty members and supporters] gathered to watch the burning of
an effigy of the Lieutenant Governor, Cadwallader Colden, as unpopular a figure as
Thomas Hutchinson of Boston and burned an effigy with Colden’s carriages, which they
had dragged out of his coach-house.”11
Following the gathering at Colden’s home, the Sons of Liberty sponsored mob
marched to the home of Major Thomas James, Commander of Fort George, and burned
“all of his Household Furniture, Wearing Apparel of himself & family, Cellar, Library of
three hundred choise Books, a great many of His Majesty’s Papers & Plans, besides all
his Manuscripts & Curiosities of Antiquity.”12 The mob did not stop with these attacks,
continued throughout the night, and destroyed several other British supporters’
residences. 13
The threats to set fire to Fort George were now a realistic possibility if the stamps
and legal papers were not relocated elsewhere. Local officials ordered Captain Kennedy
of the Coventry to remove the stamped paper and store them aboard his ship. Kennedy
refused over concerns it may appear to the Sons he supported the Stamp Act and the
several properties that he owned in the vicinity would likely fall victim to the mob.
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Kennedy’s refusal to accept the Stamps served as the last objection to Colden and forced
the Lt Governor to surrender to the will of the people.14 The Sons of Liberty became
empowered as they witnessed the effect their actions had and the utilization of violence
as a political tool.
These events in New York City on the eve of the Stamp Act’s implementation
proved extremely important for the morale of the colonist and its effect on the British
government for a number of reasons. Once the British government learned of these and
similar riots in the other American towns by the Sons of Liberty, the British were obliged
to conclude that, while it was simple enough to pass a Stamp Act through the House of
Commons, it was impossible to enforce in America so long as officials were prevented
from collecting the dues.”15 Additionally, New York City served as the headquarters of
the British Army in North America and the inability to maintain a capable military
presence was a major victory for Americans.16
The Fort George instance could have also marked the beginning of the American
Revolution had Colden not shown the restraint he did. Understanding the ramifications,
Colden later wrote had British regulars fired upon the mob, it would have likely produced
much more than bloodshed.17 He felt many innocent colonists may have been killed or
would have retreated only to return with arms and storm the fort. Several decisions, both
British and American, nearly marked November 1st, 1766 as the beginning of the
American Revolution at Fort George, New York City. The Sons of Liberty in New York
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City exposed one of the most substantial flaws in Britain’s Stamp Act; if there was no
British will or way to support the Act, its implementation and ability to collect revenue
upon the colonists was impossible.

Stamp Act Congress
The Virginia House of Burgesses prepared the first formal American protest
against the Stamp Act in May of 1765.18 Patrick Henry, a newly elected Virginian, urged
the members of the House to establish sanctioned opposition against the stamp law.19
The Burgesses contended that the government of Virginia possessed the sole authority to
tax Virginians for revenue, and their resolutions denouncing the Stamp Act circulated
through the colonies.20
Newspapers throughout the colonies reported on the event, exaggerating them to
some degree, and word spread rallying Americans behind the opposition. This formal
resistance from a colonial body laid the groundwork for others to follow suit. On June
8th, 1765, the General Court of Massachusetts went one step further by proposing an
inter-colonial meeting on the Stamp Act in New York City.21 Of the thirteen colonies,
twenty-three delegates from nine colonies attended the Stamp Act Congress between
October 7th and 24th, 1765.22 New Hampshire declined but later approved the proceedings
while Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia’s assemblies would not convene to elect
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delegates to be sent.23 By the end of 1765, eight other colonies had voted and approved
resolutions denouncing the Stamp Act and rejecting Great Britain’s right to tax the
American colonies for revenue.24
The British Stamp Act elicited yet another unintended consequence. It brought
official colonial bodies together to achieve their common goal; promotion of colonial
self-interest as a principal priority. None of those eight legislatures had passed
resolutions before the fall of 1765 and Virginia’s example undoubtedly assisted them in
the production of declarations against the Act. By the beginning of 1766, politics in most
of the colonies had assumed a shape somewhat different from that of March 1765 when
the Stamp Act was passed.25
Members of the Congress came together for twelve days, excluding Sunday, to
argue the “rights and privileges of the British American Colonists.”26 But why did it take
twelve days to draft a slightly shorter document arguing Britain's right to tax them? All
members of the Congress accepted the authority of Parliament to regulate trade
throughout the empire they had created but felt it imprudent to acknowledge such
authority in its official statement.27 The ability to wordsmith a declaration that
recognized British authority to regulate trade but rejected its right to tax them internally
for purposes of revenue proved extremely difficult.
Constitutional rights as Englishman was also a topic of discussion at the New
York sponsored Stamp Act Congress. The distinction between legislation and taxation

23

Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, 108.
Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause, 83.
25
Ibid.
26
Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, 110.
27
Ibid., 113.
24

63

was presented: Parliament had the authority to levy taxes as well as make laws in Great
Britain, but for the colonies, it could only make laws. Additionally, the British
constitution guaranteed the right to be taxed only by consent, which, the American
colonists did not provide.28
Following the colonial resolutions, the well respect Benjamin Franklin visited the
British House of Commons to discuss the colonial argument. Franklin also echoed
colonial denial that Parliament had the right to levy duties for revenue on colonial
imports and exports.29 However, he further explained the differences, and that “an
internal tax [such as a stamp tax or a tax on property] is forced from the people without
their consent, if not laid by their own representatives,” whereas a duty on exports “is
added to the first cost and other charges on the commodity, and when it is offered to sale,
makes a part of the price. If the people do not like it at that price, they… are not obliged
to pay it.”30 Franklin’s testimony did receive some colonial criticism as it confirmed
what the Stamp Act Congress’s resolutions did not: Britain’s authority over the American
colonial population and the relationship it had with the empire.
The British Parliament simply did not want to understand or embrace the colonial
opinion that it was not to tax Americans for revenue purposes. Parliament’s opinion was
that if an act were passed within its chambers, it would be obeyed by the subjects of
Great Britain, and the right of Parliament to make laws for the American colonies was
indisputable.31 Negotiations over its right to rule would simply not be entertained, at this
point, by the British government. The relationship between mother and child continued
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to become strained and steps were being taken, on both sides of the Atlantic, to enforce or
reject laws, by power if required, while written diplomacy was on the verge of no longer
remaining an option.
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CHAPTER FIVE: REPEAL AND CONSEQUENCES
“This [trade revenue] is the price that America pays you for her protection… It is, that
the Stamp Act be repealed absolutely; totally and immediately.”
-William Pitt, Address to House of Commons, January 14th, 1766
Repeal
On the eve of the repeal of the Stamp Act, the discussion of internal versus
external taxation was prevalent in both America and England. Colonists maintained their
opinion that British Parliament could not tax Americans “for the single purpose of
revenue” based upon English constitutional law and their inherent God-given rights.1 As
tensions continued to rise in America over the issue, the House of Commons began to
entertain other methods to tax British citizens in colonial America.
Following the intercolonial Stamp Act Congress at New York, William Pitt,
member of Parliament and colonial sympathizer, begged the English Ministry to accept
America’s petition and repeal the Stamp Act. The Ministry and House of Commons
offered no opportunity for the Stamp Act Congress to be heard, and the American
petition was not reviewed or received.2 October 1765 through February 1766, the
position of British taxation and its place in colonial interest continued to be discussed in
Parliament.3 British merchants involved in international trade also appealed to
Parliament through a petition in December 1765, concerned by the fear of a loss of trade,
if a colonial boycott were to take place.4 English merchants felt an embargo possible due
to the increase in restrictions on intercolonial commerce and the illegal opportunity for
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colonial businesses to source non-British products. Additionally, the fear that Americans
might default on their credit owed to British merchants while selling American produced
raw materials to competitors was a primary concern.5 The ingenuity and resourcefulness
of Americans threatened the entire British Empire as they became more creative in the
products they purchased and their utilization. Petitions from British merchants flooded
the House of Commons and the Stamp Act was no longer merely an American issue but
threatened the livelihood of British merchants and the English economy.
Benjamin Franklin was afforded the opportunity to speak to Parliament regarding
the issue in February 1766. In a three-hour testimony, Franklin dissected Parliament’s
“unconstitutional and unjust” distinction between their right to levy internal and external
taxes on Americans while they had no representation in Great Britain’s official body.6
He could not deny Parliament’s right to tax America entirely but was very explicit in the
division between internal and external taxation and colonial opinion on the matter.
The relationship between King George III and George Grenville had become
strained over legislation that would not afford the King’s mother authority in the event of
the incapacitation of the King.7 King George removed Grenville from his post as Prime
Minister and replaced him with Charles Watson-Wentworth, Second Marquis of
Rockingham.8 The new Rockingham Ministry’s agenda, commissioned by King George,
was to assert the British government’s place in colonial America in the wake of Stamp
Act riots and tame the general unrest over the legislation. During the early months of
1766 and prior to the repeal of the Stamp Act on March 18th, 1766, Parliament introduced
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three pieces of legislation that made the British repeal of the Stamp Act possible.
The first of three pieces of legislation presented to Parliament were components
of the Declaratory Act, approved the same day the Stamp Act’s repeal was to be enacted.
This act asserted the complete and absolute power over the colonies and reinforced
Parliament’s control and authority to establish laws without limit.9 Because the
discussion of taxes, both internal and external had remained such a focus, Rockingham
refrained from any mention in this declaration. Rather, the declaration was merely
focused on laws, statues, and the relationship between the Crown and those who fell
subordinate to it.10 By omitting taxes, it also removed any possibility of conversation on
the Act shifting its focus on taxes and offered a clear distinction of British authority
through legislation.
The second approved legislation was economic in nature. It branded the Stamp
Act economically unfavorable to British interests.11 This declaration showed favor with
British merchants while indicating support from the government as the American
colonies had begun to resort to smuggling from the French and Spanish. Industries
across the British economy, including the West Indies trade of natural resources, had
continued to decline as American colonists were forced to become more creative in
sourcing the products and commodities they required. The act, designed to generate
revenue and protect English interests, actually presented negative effects to those it was
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designed to protect while Americans witnessed contrary results from its intended
purpose.12
The third burden the British bestowed upon the colonies was the Townshend
Revenue Act. The act targeted molasses, glass, lead, paint, tea, and paper- imports from
both foreign and British territories and was, in a sense, the reissue of the Sugar Act.13
The American argument that they were willing to accept external taxes from government
was the focus of this act is 1767. By increasing the cost of molasses from three pence to
one penny per gallon, the Revenue Act was able to generate more revenue than any
previously imposed duty.14 Reception was varied from the colonies over this external tax
and British merchants were poised to regain their place in the American economy once
again. The Revenue Act is significant as it set a precedent for the years leading up to the
American Revolution and the method by which Parliament might approach the taxation
issue in Colonial America.
The British appeared to have progressed past the Stamp Act with the termination
of all penalties incurred from violations of the act while simultaneously validating any
document that had required a stamp. 15 Although repeal of the Stamp Act restored order
in the colonies, adoption of the Declaratory Act paved the way for a future stamp tax or
additional taxes Parliament may see fit to impose. Parliament had attempted to stretch its
authority over colonial affairs and the Stamp Act crisis laid out the distinction between
internal and external taxes for both parties.16 Englishmen and Americans had avoided
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large-scale armed conflict and civil war up until 1766. However, the Stamp Act repeal
did not restore the relationship America and Great Britain had maintained and their
connection was severely strained. In the years to come, the the United Kingdom would
take desperate actions to retain its authority over Colonial America. Their relationship
would become increasingly strained and eventually Americans would have little choice
but to meet with armed resistance projecting British America into the inevitable
revolution.
The Impending Revolution
Following the repeal of the Stamp Act, Great Britain focused its attention on
asserting its authority in the Americas with a number of legislative acts. While the
immediate threat of rebellion and civil war had been avoided between the two, Parliament
insisted upon reinforcing its authority at the expense of the rights of Englishman in
America. Americans continued to feel as if their rights and position in the British Empire
were less significant than those of their counterparts in England in the years to follow the
Stamp Act repeal.
When British Parliament began to discuss repeal of the Stamp Act, it showed
concerns that it may empower the American position and energize any separatist
movement.17 Merchant correspondents and committees in England communicated to the
colonial counterparts that violence against English officials only prolonged and nearly
prevented repeal completely.18 However, Americans were now inspired and more
sympathetic to the revolutionary cause than ever before. Merely asserting British power
to "make laws and statues… to bind the colonies and power of America… in all cases
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whatsoever" with the Declaratory Act challenged the very ideas governing American
objection to the Stamp Act.19
At the same time when Parliament had passed the Stamp Act, the Mutiny Act was
ratified, which required Americans to provide care and quarters for British troops
stationed in North America.20 The colonial assembly of New York had refused to
approve the Act until Parliament forbade the assembly to act in any official capacity,
forcing compliance. This further strained American-British relations as citizens all over
America witnessed British reign over the New York Restraining Act.21 In 1767, colonials
continued to share major objections to the Quartering Act as New York City received an
influx of British troops that were afforded accommodations at the expense of Americans.
One of the significant colonial objections to the Stamp Act had been Britain's
right to impose an internal tax. With the repeal of the Stamp Act and the need to
continue a steady flow of imperial revenue, Charles Townshend, now the Chancellor of
the Exchequer (the position the architect of the Stamp Act, George Grenville had once
held) proposed a new solution. In 1767, Parliament received and approved an act taxing
the importation of glass, lead, painters’ colors, and tea.22 Once again, Parliament’s
attempts to shift focus from internal to external taxation of the American colonies failed.23
The colonial opposition took the form of nonimportation against the taxed articles and
between 1767-1770 the importation of glass and painters’ colors was reduced by half,
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each year.24 The concentration of imports in America were primarily between Boston and
New York City (55.7%), and the continual threat of mob action against customs officials
proved just as successful now as it did during the Stamp Act crisis.25
Parliament had little choice but to repeal the failed Townshend Act and in another
attempt to maintain the image of authority, maintained the tea provision.26 Meanwhile,
the British based East India Company continued to market its tea to the international
market but had begun to struggle and called upon the English government for
assistance.27 Tea was a staple in the 18th century and not delegated to a small percentage
of the population or a social class. It was abundant in the far east and extremely
important to the British economy and the future of the Empire in India. As the East India
Company struggled to return investment to shareholders, Parliament came to its rescue at
the expense of colonial Americans, resulting in the 1773 passage of the Tea Act.28
The Tea Act is significant for a number of reasons, not only because it displayed
Britain’s favoritism of a homegrown corporation over colonial opinions as a whole, but it
represented an outright assault on American industry. The act afforded the East India
Company two substantial benefits. First, it allowed tea to be marketed directly to
colonials using its internal agents in America.29 The markets and colonial wholesalers
previously involved in the sale of tea were removed from the transaction and it was sold
directly to the consumer.30 Second, the company was exempt from the duty on tea that it
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imported to Britain and then reshipped to America.31 This would undercut the tea that
had been traded legitimately or smuggled in by American merchants (often the same
merchant).32 Colonial vendors that dealt in the most sought after commodity of the 18th
century had no chance of survival when competing with the British government backed
East India Company. The colonies banded together and refused to accept many of the
shipments. Under the mask of night on December 16th, 1773 in the Boston, colonials
went as far as to board an East India Company vessel and unload its contents, primarily
tea, into the harbor.33
The legislative acts imposed by the British in the colonies are what banded
Americans together in opposition under the veil of print, riots, non-importation, and
eventual armed resistance. British agents urged their American counterparts to refrain
from inciting violence against stamp agents or officials as it would only strengthen
Parliament’s resolve and enforcement practices.34 As early as 1773, newspapers began to
carry articles openly speculating on the timing of an American declaration of
independence.35 The Sugar Act, Stamp Act, Townshend taxes, and Tea Act represented
the major mileposts along the road to imperial crisis.36 As each act failed and was
repealed, a common British theme and principal argument existed; the colonies would
interpret it as a sign of weakness.37
By September 1774, the first Continental Congress had met in Philadelphia and

31

Countryman, The American Revolution, 47.
Ibid.
33
Morgan, Birth of the Republic, 60.
34
Morgan, The Stamp Act, 293.
35
Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause, 214.
36
Countryman, The American Revolution, 47.
37
Morgan, The Stamp Act, 293.
32

73

began working in a more official capacity than a committee of correspondence.38 One
year later and for over a decade, the largest and most powerful military and naval power
would wage war against the Continental Army while colonial merchants, lawyers, and
smugglers would be placed into positions which required them to become architects of a
new nation. The British government had acquired a tremendous amount of debt
defending both the Empire and its colonies in North America and was confronted with
difficult decisions. The decision to tax British America through legislation such as the
Stamp Act was simple; Great Britain had just defended its citizens from French
advancement and required means to generate revenue for their defense.
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CONCLUSION
“The distinction between Virginians, Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and New Englanders
are no more. I am Not A Virginian But An American!”
-Patrick Henry, Address to First Continental Congress, October 14th, 1774

The 1760’s proved to be a pivotal time in American history. The intellectual
growth colonial Americans underwent was truly amazing and the American experiment
was unlike any other. Eighteenth-century social lines were well established, even in
America, but colonial desire to be independent was contagious. Scholarship is divided on
the issue as to where overall support lay throughout British America, but the American
army always relied on popular support. 1 The revolution was a people’s war, and the
British government was faced with much more than a war on the battlefield. The colony
of New York, particularly in New York City, maintained a loyalist presence through
much of the early years of the American war for independence. However, had the British
defeated the American Army, maintaining the overall support of the colony would have
proven difficult.
America, even before its independence, had become a different entity than
England. North America had become a melting pot of cultural diversity as Europeans
viewed it as a land of opportunity well before such a phrase was coined “American.” Its
proximity to the Caribbean and other major trade routes offered a strategic and economic
advantage and its unmolested land flourished with natural resources. It should be no
surprise the importance colonial America occupied within the British Empire.
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The American Stamp Act served as one of several Acts during the imperial crisis
that defined the relationship between Great Britain and its North American colonies.
King George III and England demonstrated power and authority over their subordinates
while Americans contemplated British cause, reasoning, and motivations in their methods
of affection. The idea of relieving British burdens by taxing colonies had often been
suggested but prior to the 1760’s, viewed as an unwise gesture.2 However, the
combination of events would set America on a trajectory to self-governance and
independence.
Some Americans buried themselves in intellectual and scholarly thought on how
they may shape their new nation while others strived to nurture their seasonal harvests.
Their connections may have been loose but America’s failing relationship with Great
Britain fostered the progress of intercolonial relationships. Every medium of written
expression was utilized to educate and inform their fellow citizens.3 Newspapers were
filled with arguments and counterarguments, letters, speeches, sermons, broadsides,
placards, booklets, and pamphlets, and all carried equal importance in opposition to the
Stamp Act and others. Conventional and unconventional American thought share their
roots during this crucial stage in history.
It may have been Britain's endeavors that overextended its reach in America in an
attempt to enforce its authority, protect its interests, and finance troops garrisoned in the
thirteen colonies which ultimately laid the groundwork for American independence. Had
its actions been anticipated, Great Britain would have likely taken a different approach to
imperial administrative policies in North America. To focus on just the American
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patriotic movement frankly glosses over the complexity of the relationship between
Britain and the colonies. France and Great Britain continued to protect their interests
from one another while competing as the dominant powers at sea, and in other areas.
As a colony and eventual state, New York represented an accurate portrayal of the
greater population within North America. It offered tremendous social, political, and
economic diversity spanning from New York City to the Niagara Frontier.
Revolutionaries who found themselves within the ranks of the Sons of Liberty,
publishing newspapers, pamphlets, and placards leading up to and surrounding
themselves in the Stamp Act had a major impact on the direction America found itself
during 1765 and years to come. Producing leaders from unlikely places and professions
was simply what New York became great at. Ultimately, the Stamp Act had a very
profound effect on the American experiment: it hurled the American colonies into a
whirlwind of social, political, and economic changes and self-discovery that would be
explored for years to come. This piece of legislation can be credited for causing enough
discontent within British America that eventually led to the American patriot movement,
the war for independence, and an example of revolutionary thought and demonstration to
others in the coming years.
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